Muivah’s speech firmly articulates a Naga maximalist stance rooted in identity, history, and political aspiration. Yet it signals a difficult negotiation ahead, as New Delhi is constrained by structural limits and wary of any settlement implying separate sovereignty or sub-nationalist symbols.
By Dhiren A. Sadokpam
National Socialist Council of Nagalim – NSCN (I-M) Ato Kilonser Thuigaleng Muivah marking a return to his birthplace, Somdal, after five decades, is one of the most significant events in recent Naga political history. Returning to his native place in Manipur has a potent mix of personal reflection and political assertion. However, what was even more striking was the nonagenarian’s speech, which was read out by Deputy Ato Kilonser VS Atem, at Ukhrul Headquarters, Manipur, on October 22.
The speech is rhetorically powerful and symbolically effective for Nagas of all territorial dispositions. Muivah’s speech lays down clear red-lines and re-asserts ethno-nationalist identity and historical grievances, which is politically important. By anchoring demands in a maximalist form (a combination of demands for a separate flag, constitution and territorial claims) without sufficiently engaging with how these might be accommodated within India’s existent political order, the speech risks deeply entrenching the current impasse.
Muivah’s speech (and allied documented statements earlier) reaffirm key claims: that Nagas have a “unique history and position”, that a separate Naga flag and constitution are non-negotiable, and that the relationship envisaged under the 2015 Framework Agreement is one of two entities co-existing and sharing sovereign power. The speech leaves no doubt that the demand is for something more than token autonomy — it seeks formal recognition of Naga nationhood via “flag and constitution”. This clarity helps keep many sections of the Naga side united (at least symbolically) and makes the negotiation parameters transparent. By anchoring the demand in Naga history, identity, and collective memory (“unique history … people under God”), Muivah strengthens the moral claim and attempts to build popular legitimacy within Naga society, already battered by political manoeuvrings and all too visible cracks within the supposedly unified post-Naga National Council (NNC) history. Though uncompromising on core demands, Muivah also emphasises that the NSCN-(I-M) remains committed to an “honourable and acceptable negotiated political settlement”.
Maximalist Demands Risk Negotiation Deadlock
By making the “flag and constitution” non-negotiable, the written and diligently crafted speech, reduces the “zone of possible agreement” unless the Indian side is willing to move — which, will be discussed below, seems unlikely. This could prolong the conflict, foster frustration, or push toward relapse into anxiety fuelled violence. It looks as though the threat of armed resistance has been explicitly invoked if the core demands are not met.
There is also the ambiguity of what “shared sovereignty” means. The Naga side invokes shared sovereignty (via the Framework Agreement) but the contours remain vague. What areas of governance remain with Nagas, what with New Delhi? How would a separate constitution operate inside India’s federal/constitutional framework? The speech glosses over how this would work concretely though there seems to be many analysts who had not only conjectured the “would-be model” but also write meaningful thoughts on the same issue. Their works have been circulated both at the national and international narrative manufacturing battlegrounds. Hardly anyone can escape from these conjectural onslaughts. More on this later.
The demands espoused by NSCN (I-M) is not just for Nagaland state but for a “Nagalim” that potentially includes contiguous areas in Manipur, Assam, Arunachal and even in Myanmar. This broad claim raises major stakes for neighbouring states and the Indian union. Muivah’s reference to “Nagalim national struggle for the liberation of Nagalim from the occupational force of India and Myanmar” underscores this expansive territorial aspiration.
While the speech projects positive unity, the Naga political landscape is fractured (multiple factions, NNPGs etc.). The insistence on NSCN (I-M)’s primacy may further complicate inclusive settlement. Even if the flag and constitution were accepted symbolically, questions remain of how this interacts with Indian sovereignty, fiscal integration, security, defence, external affairs, and cross-border issues. The speech does not fully address the implications for other communities in the region (e.g., non-Naga tribes/communities) or the practicalities of governance.
New Delhi is unlikely to meet such demands without major concessions elsewhere — and that means the negotiation may stall or the Naga side may face the choice of either softening demands or returning to old ways—days of political violence.
Will Government of India Easily Give In
From New Delhi’s perspective, several major structural constraints and risks explain why the demand for a separate Naga flag and constitution (especially if seen as sovereignty) is very difficult.
A demand for a separate national constitution and flag implicitly suggests a sovereign polity — or at minimum a “special provision” that might set precedent for other armed political movements in Northeast India. The Government of India has consistently stated that “No separate flag and Constitution for Nagas” are acceptable. After the abrogation of Jammu & Kashmir’s constitutional provision (and loss of its flag/constitution), the Indian government underlines that granting separate constitutional status is contrary to its integrationist/unionist model.
The territorial claim of Nagalim crosses several states. Accepting such demands would inevitably trigger strong opposition from those states (Assam, Manipur, Arunachal) and other tribal/ethnic groups (non-Nagas) who fear loss of rights and territory.
India’s Northeast has multiple armed movements; granting concessions here may be perceived as encouraging other ethno-nationalist groups and their demands. While the Indian Constitution does not explicitly define “federalism,” Article 1’s description of India as a “Union of States” suggests a federal structure with a strong central authority, reflected in its division of powers between the centre and states alongside notable unitary features. Hence, India’s amorphous idea of federalism and the Constitution do not easily accommodate separate constitutions for sub-units. Creating such an arrangement would either require constitutional amendment or exceptional provisions/status— something the Indian government has shown reluctance to do for years.
With parts of the claimed area in Myanmar (and Naga groups operating cross-border), any settlement must navigate sensitive international boundaries, networks of what has been called “rebels”, and external influences (including from China and Myanmar). This raises complex geostrategic risks for India.
Thus, while talks continue, the Indian government will continue to insist on a solution within the constitutional parameters of India, maximum autonomy rather than separate sovereignty, and without setting a precedent that weakens its idea of national integration.
Acceptability in Changing Global Geopolitical Game
Despite the difficulties, there are plausible reasons why the Indian government — and even neighbouring states — may find pieces of the Naga demand acceptable (or negotiable) in the current global context.
The Northeast frontier (Nagaland/Manipur/Arunachal) lies along India’s land-route to Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand). Peace in this region can enhance connectivity (e.g., India–Myanmar–Thailand Trilateral Highway), trade, infrastructure, and strategic depth. Analysts have argued resolving the Naga issue helps India’s external connectivity and border-region stability. Accepting meaningful autonomy for Nagas could reduce what has been termed as insurgency, open up border corridors, and strengthen India’s presence in the Indo-Pacific.
A stable settlement with Nagas would free up defence and internal security resources from the Northeast, allowing India to focus on other strategic priorities (China, Pakistan, Myanmar). A generous settlement may therefore have strategic payoff. A well-negotiated autonomy settlement could strengthen India’s relationship with ethnic communities, reduce alienation, bolster inclusion and development. This may reduce future armed movements and serve as a model for other regions.
States like Manipur, Assam, Arunachal may benefit from a stable Naga peace process (less violence, development potential, connectivity). If the settlement includes institutional guarantees (e.g., local legislative councils, cultural rights) rather than full territorial integration, they may accept it.
Geopolitical Competition and External Actors
With China’s increasing interest in the Northeast region (via Myanmar etc), a stable Naga region serves India’s aim of containing external interference. India may be more willing to offer symbolic recognition (flag, local constitution) if it helps neutralise external leverage in insurgencies. This can serve as a point of departure for bigger and longer debate on what ails political instability in India’s Northeast.
Therefore, while full sovereignty is unlikely to be offered by New Delhi, it may be willing to negotiate creative models of autonomy that incorporate Naga identity (flag, name, cultural constitution) within the Indian constitutional framework — especially under a broader strategic lens.
On one hand, Muivah’s eloquently crafted speech represents a firm Naga maximalist position grounded in identity, history, and political aspiration. On the one hand, it sets the stage for a tough negotiation because New Delhi faces numerous structural constraints. The Government of India is likely to resist any settlement perceived to grant separate sovereignty, full territorial integration of contiguous areas, or a precedent for subnational constitutions and flags.
Yet, the shifting global context—greater East-Asia integration, connectivity projects, border infrastructure, competition with China, emphasis on internal security and development—gives pragmatism to the Indian side. If the Naga leadership signals flexibility (for example, accepting strong autonomy rather than semi-political-sovereignty; limiting territorial claims; accommodating neighboring states; agreeing on competencies in a well-defined federal model) then a settlement might be reached that recognises Naga identity (e.g., a symbolically distinct flag or constitution) while preserving Indian constitutional unity.
Muivah’s rigid demand may impede compromise unless both sides move. India may not “give in” to full demands, but could negotiate a special autonomous provision for the Nagas—one that acknowledges identity, grants significant self-governance, perhaps allows a Naga flag/local constitution symbolic of identity, but within the framework of India’s Constitution and without destabilizing neighboring states. The bigger question that stares on the face of any observer is—Will a new special autonomous provision be more elaborate and accommodating than Article 371A of the Indian Constitution? This Article grants Nagaland special autonomy, safeguarding its religious and social customs, customary laws, and land ownership from automatic application of central laws. Parliamentary acts on these matters require approval by the State Legislative Assembly, while the Governor holds key for law and order.
Constraints and the Road Ahead
New Delhi is deeply constrained by concerns of territorial integrity, constitutional precedent and the political backlash in neighboring states; it has repeatedly resisted explicit recognition of a separate Naga flag/constitution. The Amsterdam Joint Communiqué and 2015 Framework Agreement are politically important, but New Delhi’s operational posture is to keep outcomes internal to India’s constitutional order.
The Government of India would refuse formal recognition of a national Naga flag and a separate sovereign constitution. It might allow a cultural or representational flag (protocol use at cultural events, museums, camps) and permit a locally framed “Yehzabo” (Naga customary charter) that has symbolic status but is subordinate to the Constitution of India.
Any move can be also be perceived as “betrayal” by hardliners and there is the fear of possible renewal of armed activity by factions that would reject limited outcomes. The Government of India accepting the “symbolic flag” could mean a strong, legally-backed customary charter (with protected competencies) for the Nagas as a transitional step. But there should be mechanisms intact, so that any final settlement could become durable.
Having said this, the NSCN (I-M) need to push for detailed, legally-enforceable lists of competencies, dispute-resolution mechanisms, financial transfers, and protections for Naga identity (language, land rights, customary law). Can Muivah’s group do this without the help of other Naga factions in the state of Nagaland? One needs to wait and watch. Nevertheless, an honourable and acceptable settlement should be based on peaceful coexistence, mutual respect, and non-use of force (military). Any settlement should ensure the dignity of Naga political identity while securing the confidence of non-Naga neighboring communities—here, there and now.
.(Dhiren A. Sadokpam is Editor-in-Chief, The Frontier Manipur)