Beijing’s export restrictions have presumably turbocharged New Delhi’s National Critical Minerals Mission, forcing India to look for alternatives. Rebel-held Kachin State in Myanmar, which supplies nearly half of the world’s dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb), may now emerge as a strategic frontier.
By S Khar
Beneath the mountains of Myanmar’s Kachin State lies a resource coveted by the world’s most powerful economies: rare earth minerals. These critical elements fuel 21st-century technologies—electric vehicles, wind turbines, advanced weaponry—and now sit at the heart of India’s geopolitical chess game. Yet, the pursuit of these resources by other countries through covert ties with Myanmar’s armed rebel groups may prove as perilous as it is promising.
China’s Chokehold and India’s Urgency
When India’s Commerce Minister Piyush Goyal warned in June 2025 of “rare earth magnet shortages threatening EV production lines,” he exposed a critical vulnerability: 81% of India’s rare earth imports rely on China. Beijing’s export restrictions have turbocharged New Delhi’s National Critical Minerals Mission, forcing India to look for alternatives. Rebel-held Kachin State, which supplies nearly half of the world’s dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb), may now emerge as a strategic frontier.
India’s state-owned Rare Earths Limited (IREL) has reportedly surveyed Kachin’s mines. Meanwhile, there are reports that foreign diplomats in Thailand are said to be quietly courting officials of an armed Myanmar rebel group with promises of aid and infrastructure support. Central to this strategy is the revival of the Stilwell Road, a World War II supply line. If restored, it could funnel Kachin’s minerals through India to Western markets—bypassing China altogether.
KIA’s Double Game: From Training Insurgents to Courting India
The KIA is no stranger to India. Since the 1980s, there have been reports that its camps hosted insurgents from Northeast India. It is said that Manipur based insurgent groups received KIA training followed by Assam based armed groups between 1987 and 1988. Other groups operating between India and Myanmar is said to have benefited from weapon pipelines in the 1990s.
Yet, in 1989, the KIA is said to have struck a covert deal with a neighboring country, exchanging intelligence against Myanmar’s military for limited support. This marriage of convenience, steeped in political pragmatism, foreshadows the contradictions that define today’s rare earth courtship.
India’s Tentative Move
Sources in Myanmar informed that in January 2025, Indian consular officials reportedly met KIA representatives in Chiang Mai under the cover of “medical humanitarian aid.” Simultaneously, the Chin National Front (CNF) rebels accelerated work on the Mizoram-Matupi highway with Indian Army engineers clearing mines and repairing sections of the Stilwell Road. Together, these projects could connect mineral-rich Kachin to Indian Ocean ports. “America needs rare earths and India craves strategic leverage,” notes one Myanmar scholar who does not want to be identified. “These roads pave the way for minerals to bypass Myanmar’s federal government entirely.”
The Trap: Opportunism and Logistics
Yet the risks are formidable. The KIA’s core ambition—an independent Kachin state—runs directly against India’s principled stance on sovereignty, particularly given its struggles with northeastern armed groups. Rakhine National Party leader Tun Aung Kyaw has warned: “Rakhine State hosts China’s energy corridor. If the Arakan Army achieves independence, superpower rivalry will explode here… We need superpower backing.” This “resources-for-independence” logic makes groups like the KIA opportunistic allies, prone to shifting loyalties when expedient.
Logistical hurdles deepen the quagmire:
- Fragile Infrastructure: A single mountain road is easily cut off. Chinese firms manage with small-scale trucking; India lacks similar reach.
- Weak Refining Capacity: Even with access to raw ore, India lacks advanced refining technology. Much of the ore could still end up in China, perpetuating dependency.
India’s Impossible Choice
New Delhi now faces a strategic paradox. On the one hand, Myanmar’s Rakhine coast is central to India’s Act East Policy. On the other, engaging with armed groups like the KIA and CNF undermines India’s long-standing opposition to armed insurgent groups in its own northeast region.
The dual-track policy—official trade worth $2.1 billion with Myanmar’s junta in 2024–25, alongside shadow dealings with rebel groups—risks collapsing under its own contradictions. Should the junta discover India’s covert outreach, it could lean fully into Beijing’s embrace.
Geopolitical Gamble with High Stakes
History suggests the KIA is an unreliable partner, more survival-driven than loyal. Strengthening ties risks rekindling insurgency in India’s northeast, alienating Myanmar’s junta, and damaging India’s credibility as a regional power. India’s rare earth gambit could reshape the regional balance—or backfire spectacularly. At its core lies a dangerous gamble: whether short-term access to critical minerals is worth the long-term erosion of sovereignty principles and regional trust.